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I.   INTRODUCTION 
Directors have a legal obligation to act with care in managing the 
business of the corporation. Under Delaware law, the duty has largely 
evolved into a process standard. Informed decisions made by independ-
ent directors receive judicial deference.  Process standards, however, can 
sometimes generate irrational results.  The doctrine of waste, therefore, 
amounts to an outer boundary for decisions otherwise protected by the 
business judgment rule. 
Although theoretically imposing limits, the doctrine of waste in 
practice does little to reign in board decisions. Courts rarely make a find-
ing of waste, even when the asserted benefits are marginal or the 
amounts expended appear disproportionate to any benefits received. 
“Benefit” has also been interpreted broadly and includes past considera-
tion as well as standard contractual provisions.  Further, the courts assess 
the challenged amount against the size of the company, dismissing waste 
claims for significant payments when made by large public companies. 
This approach arises in large part from a judicial gloss that views judges 
as ill-suited to analyze the benefits of business decisions and defers to the 
judgment of independent directors.    
This paper analyzes the application of the doctrine of waste under 
Delaware law. Section II discusses the history and the current test for 
waste. Section III discusses waste and instances where the issue is 
whether the corporation received a benefit. Section IV discusses waste 
and instances where the issue is whether the corporation overpaid. Sec-
tion V explores the effectiveness of the waste doctrine. 
II.  THE STANDARD FOR WASTE  
The duty of care has evolved into a process standard.2 Noting that 
proper process can sometimes produce irrational results, the Delaware 
  
 * JD, University of Denver Sturm College of Law, May 2015. 
94 DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW ONLINE [Vol. 92  
courts recognize that the waste of corporate assets will be actionable 
even if shareholders have not rebutted the presumption of the business 
judgment rule.3 Waste occurs when an exchange is “so one sided that no 
business person of ordinary, sound judgment could conclude that the 
corporation has received adequate consideration.”4 Waste does not exist 
where “there is any substantial consideration received by the corpora-
tion, and there is a good faith judgment that in the circumstances the 
transaction is worthwhile.”5 Nor will waste occur where the matter turns 
out other than as shareholders and management expected;6 nor will 
claims succeed based upon “flawed process.”7 
Allegations of waste must overcome difficult pleading standards. 
“The pleading burden on a plaintiff attacking a corporate transaction as 
wasteful is necessarily higher than that of a plaintiff challenging a trans-
action as ‘unfair’ as a result of the directors’ conflicted loyalties or lack 
of due care.”8 For example, the court dismissed a claim where the plain-
tiff challenged a merger but failed to plead facts supporting the “conclu-
sion that no rational person could regard the merger as sensible.”9 Fur-
ther, shareholders could not plead a claim of waste simply by presenting 
facts indicating that compensation agreements were “generous (and, per-
haps excessively so).”10 Additionally, courts do not permit waste claims 
where other standards are more applicable.11 
Early cases arose from efforts to assert that sufficient process could 
defeat a claim for waste. Boards sought to defend allegations by asserting 
that the challenged behavior had been approved by shareholders. The 
  
 2. J. Robert Brown, Jr., Disloyalty without Limits: “Independent” Directors and the Elimi-
nation of the Duty of Loyalty, 95 KY. L.J. 53, 57 (2006-07). (Any residual content to the duty of care 
was eliminated with the universal adoption of waiver of liability provisions) 
 3. See Sample v. Morgan, 914 A.2d 647, 669 (Del. Ch. 2007); (“Conceived more realistical-
ly, the doctrine of waste is a residual protection for stockholders that polices the outer boundaries of 
the broad field of discretion afforded directors by the business judgment rule.”); see also Steven C. 
Caywood, Wasting the Corporate Waste Doctrine: How the Doctrine Can Provide a Viable Solution 
in Controlling Excessive Executive Compensation, 109 MICH. L. REV. 111, 115 (2010) (‘The corpo-
rate waste doctrine has been described as an ‘equitable safety valve,’ meaning that it can be used for 
cases where relief would be otherwise unavailable.”). 
 4. Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 263 (Del. 2000).  
 5. Id. (quoting Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 327, 336 (Del. Ch. 1997) (emphasis in origi-
nal). 
 6. See Ash v. McCall, No. Civ.A. 17132, 2000 WL 1370341, at *8 (Del. Ch. Sept. 15, 2000) 
(”The fact that the merger turned out badly or, indeed, abominably for McKesson simply does not 
and cannot mean that approval of the merger was an act of corporate waste at the time the McKesson 
board entered into it.”).  
 7. In general, such a claim must be “properly brought” as a claim for breach of the duty of 
care.” In re NYMEX S’holder Litig., 2009 WL 3206051, at *7 (Del. Ch. Sept. 30, 2009). 
 8. Harbor Fin. Partners v. Huizenga, 751 A.2d 879, 892 (Del. Ch. 1999).  
 9. Id.  
 10. TVI Corp. v. Gallagher, C.A. No. 7798-VCP, 2013 WL 5809271, at *17 (Del. Ch. Octo-
ber 28, 2013). 
 11. See Hampshire Grp., Ltd. v. Kuttner, C.A. No. 3607-VCS, 2010 WL 2739995, at *35 
(Del. Ch. July 12, 2010) (concluding waste claim should be dismissed because the essence of the 
violation was really a breach of the duty of loyalty by knowingly permitting an illegal practice and 
not corporate waste).  
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courts, however, found that process in the form of shareholder ratifica-
tion would not protect a board from allegations of waste.  “An uncon-
scionable deal between directors personally and the corporation they 
represent could not become conscionable merely because most of the 
stockholders were either indifferent or actually in sympathy with the 
directors’ scheme.”12 Proper process provided legal benefits but did not 
eliminate the claim.13 
Nonetheless, these early cases set a high bar for the application of 
waste.  Courts viewed themselves as ill equipped to determine “the rela-
tionship of the value received by the corporation to the benefit be-
stowed.”14 As a result, value or benefit was primarily “a matter of judg-
ment on the part of the person who must pay for them” and required def-
erence “to decisions of directors and stockholders.”15 Nonetheless, pay-
ments may grow “so disproportionately large as to be unconscionable 
and constitute waste.”16 
III.  WASTE AND CORPORATE BENEFIT  
Waste can arise where the corporation received no benefit in a 
transaction. In those circumstances, any payment is excessive. Courts 
have addressed the issue in the context of past consideration, the failure 
to maximize tax benefits in a transaction, and benefits arising from the 
inclusion of standard provisions in severance contracts.   
A. Past Consideration 
Early cases presumed that companies did not benefit from past con-
sideration “since the amount of the salary to the executive had been fixed 
by previous agreement and the services had been performed.”17 Early 
exceptions, however, developed.  Past consideration sufficed for pay-
ments made “pursuant to an implied contract” and “amounts awarded 
that were not unreasonable in view of the services rendered.”18 As the 
court concluded in Blish v. Thompson Automatic Arms Corporation:  
“[T]he services rendered by the executive were unusual in character and 
extraordinary, from which the corporation received great gains and prof-
  
 12. Gottlieb v. Heyden Chemical Corp., 90 A.2d 660, 665 (Del. 1952). 
 13. Saxe v. Brady, 184 A.2d 602, 610 (Del. Ch. 1962) (clarifying that disinterested sharehold-
er approval shifted burden to shareholders “to convince the court that no person of ordinary, sound 
business judgment would be expected to entertain the view that the consideration was a fair ex-
change for the value which was given.”).  
 14. Id. at 610. 
 15. Id.  
 16. In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 138 (Del. Ch. 2009). 
 17. Blish v. Thompson Automatic Arms Corp., 64 A.2d 581, 606 (Del. 1948). 
 18. Id. at 588-89 (citing Osborne v. United Gas Improvement Co., 46 A.2d 208, 211 (PA 
1946).  
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its; therefore, the retroactive feature of the executive’s increases in salary 
. . . were proper under the second exception as noted above.”19 
In Zupnick v. Goizueta,20 shareholders challenged an award of op-
tions to the CEO of Coca Cola on the basis of past performance.21 Under 
the leadership of the CEO, the company gained $69 billion in market 
value.22 The court cited to the exception in Blish and upheld the award 
because of the “remarkable increase in market value” of Coca Cola dur-
ing the CEO’s tenor.23 
More recent cases, however, have largely eliminated any limits on 
the use of past consideration to justify additional compensation. Extraor-
dinary efforts are no longer necessary.  In Zucker v. Andreessen, 24 the 
departing CEO received a severance package valued at $40 million or 
more.25 The board in part justified the amount on the basis of past per-
formance.26  Rather than show dramatic growth, however, the facts 
showed an absence of “significant loss.”27 The court found this sufficient 
to defeat a claim for waste.28 
Courts have acknowledged other benefits that can justify payments 
on the basis of past consideration. Such payments may encourage an 
employee to continue his or her employment. Severance, even if not le-
gally required, “may serve as a signal to current and future employees 
that they, too, might receive extra compensation at the end of their tenure 
if they successfully serve their term.”29 The payments may also ensure “a 
smooth and harmonious transfer of power, securing a good relationship 
with the retiring employee, preventing future embarrassing disclosure 
and lawsuits.”30 Indeed, the failure to pay severance may “undermine[] 
efforts to attract outside executive talent.”31  
  
 19. Blish, 64 A.2d at 606 (concluding services were extraordinary “largely because of [the 
CEO’s] business acumen and constant efforts” which “sprung [the company] from the steps of 
poverty to a successful and internationally known arms corporation” in just two and one-half years 
with $11,000,000 in net profits).  
 20. Zupnick v. Goizueta, 698 A.2d 384 (Del. Ch.1997).  
 21. Id. at 385. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. at 388. 
 24. Zucker v. Andreessen, C.A. No. 6014-VCP, 2012 WL 2366448, at *1 (Del. Ch. June 21, 
2012). 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. at 9. 
 27. Id. at *9 (“Plaintiff does not allege that the Company suffered significant losses during 
[the CEO’s] tenure as CEO or that he otherwise was an ineffectual executive,” and finding that 
under these circumstances “at least some portion of [the CEO’s] severance could represent ‘reasona-
ble’ compensation for his successful past performance.”).  
 28. Id. at *10 (justifying dismissal of waste action not just because of the past performance 
but also because of the contractual releases the CEO provided to the coming as part of his severance 
agreement).  
 29. Seinfeld v. Slager, Civil Action No. 6462-VCG, 2012 WL 2501105, at *6 (Del. Ch. June 
29, 2012). 
 30. Id.  
 31. Zucker, 2012 WL 2366448, at *9. 
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B. Tax Benefits 
Boards have “no general fiduciary duty to minimize taxes.”32 Dela-
ware courts therefore reject allegations of waste based upon such claims 
at least where boards have a business justification for the transaction at 
issue.33   
In Haber v. Bell,34 the plaintiffs alleged waste when the company 
altered a benefit plan following changes in the law.35 The amendments 
resulted in the loss of tax deductions for employee stock options.  To 
sustain a claim for waste, the court found that plaintiffs needed to show 
that the board lacked the authority to adopt the amendments or “that the 
options [were] of such gross disparity of consideration as to make Board 
approval appear to be of the type no reasonable businessman could ap-
prove.”36 Having failed to make the requisite showing, the court dis-
missed the claim.37   
Similarly, courts will not sanction a board for failing to obtain tax 
benefits where doing so results in the loss of flexibility in awarding com-
pensation. In Freedman v. Adams,38 the plaintiff asserted that “by failing 
to structure the cash bonuses as tax-deductible compensation,” the board 
cost the company “tens of millions of dollars ” under  Section 162(m) of 
the IRC.39 That provision limited the deductibility of cash bonuses above 
$1 million to those structured as “performance-based compensation.”40 
By failing to qualify under the provision, the company, shareholders al-
leged, effectively “gave a gift to the federal government for which it re-
ceived no consideration.”41  
The court noted that the failure to qualify under the provision was 
designed to avoid being “constrained” in awarding compensation and 
provide increased flexibility. “The Board believed that it received con-
sideration for forgoing the tax deductions, namely, the flexibility to set 
executive compensation without any constraints imposed by a § 162(m) 
plan.”42 Such a justification defeated the claim for waste.  
  
 32. Seinfeld, 2012 WL 2501105, at *3 (citing Freedman v. Adams, C.A. No. 4199-VCN, 2012 
WL 1345638, at *12 (Del. Ch. Mar. 30, 2012).  
 33. Quadrant Structured Prods. Co. v. Vertin, 102 A.3d 155, 169 (Del. Ch. 2014) (in chal-
lenge to whether there was any corporate benefit to the non-deferral of interest on debt notes, court 
allowed the waste claim to proceed citing to the complaint that “the Board could have charted a 
course that would result in the Company never having to pay anything”).  
 34. Haber v. Bell, 465 A.2d 353 (Del. Ch. 1983).  
 35. Id. at 359. 
 36. Id. (citing Saxe v. Brady, 184 A.2d 602 (1962)). 
 37. Id. 
 38. Freedman v. Adams, C.A. No. 4199-VCN, 2012 WL 1345638, at *1 (Del. Ch. Mar. 30, 
2012). 
 39. 26 U.S.C. § 162(m)(4)(C) (2012).  
 40. Id. 
 41. Freedman, 2012 WL 1345638, at *14. 
 42. Id.  
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One case did find that the failure to obtain tax benefits under Sec-
tion 162(m) could result in waste. In Resnik v. Woertz,43 the company 
allegedly failed to reapprove a compensation plan in a timely fashion 
and, as a result, could not deduct payments under Section 162(m).44 The 
complaint alleged that the plan allowed for payments of up to 
$90,250,000.00 per board member.45 As a result, the inability to deduct 
payments under the plan could result in “substantial and avoidable tax 
liability.”46 The court found that “no person of ordinary sound judgment 
could view the benefits received in the transaction as a fair exchange for 
the consideration paid by ADM.”47  
In general, therefore, the failure to maximize tax benefits will not 
constitute waste, at least where the underlying transaction has a business 
purpose. Resnik amounts to an exception. One court, however, explained 
away the decision by emphasizing both the magnitude of the lost tax 
deductions and that the “compensation plan at issue [in Resnick] . . . in-
troduced elements of excessive compensation, director interestedness, 
and a lack of candor not present in the instant case.”48 
C. Contractual Benefits  
Courts have also found benefit in the form of routine provisions that 
appear in severance agreements. These include extensions of the period 
of confidentiality for information possessed by the departing officer, 
non-disparagement clauses, and obligations to cooperate. Similarly, re-
leases from liability constitute benefit. 
In Zucker v. Andreessen,49 the board approved a severance agree-
ment in part based upon the officer’s willingness to agree to a release 
from liability against the company.50  Plaintiffs alleged that the release 
had little value since the company had grounds to terminate the official 
for cause.51 The court, however, disagreed, finding that the company 
benefited from the execution of the waiver.52  The officer may not have 
acquiesced to “for cause” dismissal and “[c]reative counsel advocating 
on [the officer’s] behalf could have claimed that he, in fact, was entitled 
  
 43. Resnik v. Woertz, 774 F. Supp. 2d 614 (D.C. Del. 2011).  
 44. Id. at 619. 
 45. Id. at 633.  
 46. Id.   
 47. Id.  
 48. Freedman, 2012 WL 1345638, at *15.  Courts have also been less likely to find waste 
where a transaction eliminated a corporate benefit that was speculative. See In re Limited, Inc., No. 
Civ.A. 17148-NC, 2002 WL 537692, at *8 (Del. Ch. Mar. 27, 2002).  
 49. Zucker v. Andreessen, C.A. No. 6014-VCP, 2012 WL 2366448 (Del. Ch. June 21, 2012) 
 50. Id. at *3. 
 51. Id., 2012 WL 2366448, at *8 (alleging that “the Board could have avoided paying [CEO] 
severance under the Company's general executive officer severance policy by terminating him for 
Cause.”) 
 52. Id.  
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to severance under [the company’s] general executive officer severance 
plan notwithstanding the expense report violations.”53  
The court took a different view of the value of standard contract 
terms in In re Citigroup.54 Shareholders filed a derivative action alleging 
that the directors engaged in waste by approving a severance package for 
the retiring CEO.55 The CEO would “receive $68 million upon his depar-
ture from Citigroup, including bonus, salary, and accumulated stockhold-
ings.56 The agreement also provided that the CEO would receive “an 
office, an administrative assistant, and a car and drive for the lesser of 
five years or until he commences full time employment with another 
employer.”57  
The letter agreement memorializing the package “contemplated that 
[the CEO] would sign a non-compete agreement, a non-disparagement 
agreement, a non-solicitation agreement, and a release of claims against 
the Company.”58 The court held that the presence of these provisions 
were not enough to warrant dismissal of the plaintiff’s claims.59 “Without 
more information . . . there is reasonable doubt as to whether the letter 
agreement meets the admittedly stringent ‘so one sided’ standard or 
whether the letter agreement awarded compensation that is beyond the 
‘outer limit’ described by the Delaware Supreme Court.”60  
In one case, shareholders argued that the structure of a contract re-
sulted in waste. In Brehm v. Eisner,61 the plaintiff brought a derivative 
suit alleging that the Board committed waste by entering into an em-
ployment agreement that “was structured to ‘incentivize’ [the officer] to 
seek an early non-fault termination.”62 The contract did so by providing 
for greater compensation the earlier the officer departed.63 The court, 
however, emphasized that “the size and structure of executive compensa-
tion are inherently maters of judgment.”64 The fact that the agreement 
paid the officer more for early dismissal was of no consequence in de-
termining waste because “the former Board determined that in order to 
attract [the officer] to Disney, Disney would have to offer him a highly 
  
 53. Id. at *8 (noting that general releases also avoided the possible costs the company would 
need to incur to defend any claim including “considerable costs of time, resources, and negative 
publicity in the interim”).  
 54. In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106 (Del. Ch. 2009). 
 55. Id. at 110.   
 56. Id. at 138. 
 57. Id.  
 58. Id.  
 59. Id.  
 60. Id. at 137.  
 61. Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000). 
 62. Id. at 263.  
 63. Essentially, “the contract gave Ovitz an incentive to find a way to exit the Company via a 
non-fault termination as soon as possible because doing so would permit him to earn more than he 
could by fulfilling his contract.” Id. at 251.  
 64. Id. at 263.  
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attractive compensation package.”65 In return, the officer left his current 
position as chairman of another company.66  
Ordinary contract provisions can, therefore, provide a corporation 
with benefit. The court in Citibank, however, indicated that these provi-
sions may not always be sufficient to justify substantial payments.67 In-
deed, one commentator suggested that the case “may weaken the heavy 
burden imposed by Brehm” and “open the door for a successful share-
holder claim of excessive executive compensation.”68 
D. Conclusion 
When confronting claims of waste, courts analyze what benefit the 
company received from the challenged transaction. Courts impose a 
highly deferential standard in determining whether a corporation has 
received something of benefit.   
IV.  WASTE AND EXCESSIVE PAYMENT 
Claims for waste may also occur where the company makes pay-
ments disproportionate to the benefit received. These allegations arise 
most often in the context of executive compensation, overpayment for 
services, and sale of undervalued assets.  Waste can also occur through 
the payment of an excessive price in an acquisition of another compa-
ny.69 Given the presence of a benefit, courts rarely second-guess whether 
the amount paid was excessive and routinely defer to the judgment of the 
board. 
A. Vendor Payments 
Allegations of waste have arisen with respect to the amount paid to 
consultants or other advisors. In Highland Legacy Ltd. v. Singer,70 a 
stockholder “alleged that the directors committed corporate waste by 
paying exorbitant fees and warrants” to two financial advisory firms.71 
The challenged services involved the payment of $3 million for consulta-
tion on financial and restructuring matters following the company’s 
  
 65. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A. 2d 342, 362 (Del. Ch. 1998) (reversed on 
other grounds by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000)). 
 66. Id. (“In exchange for providing [the officer] the compensation package under the terms of 
the Employment Agreement, [the officer] agreed to leave his position as chairman of CAA to be-
come president of Disney.”). 
 67. In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 138 (Del. Ch. 2009). 
 68. Steven C. Caywood, Wasting the Corporate Waste Doctrine: How the Doctrine can 
Provide a Viable Solution in Controlling Excessive Executive Compensation, 109 MICH. L. REV. 
111, 119 (2010). 
 69. In re Nat’l Auto Credit, Inc. S’holders Litig., 2003 WL 139768 at *13 (Del. Ch. Jan. 10, 
2003) (noting acquisition “raised serious eyebrows” because of “the sheer magnitude of the purchase 
price” and the open question as to “whether [the company] was purchasing anything, other than a 
shelter” for the CEO).  
 70. Highland Legacy Ltd. v. Singer, No. Civ.A. 1566-N, 2006 WL 741939 (Del. Ch. Mar. 17, 
2006).  
 71. Id. at *1. 
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emergence from bankruptcy.72 In addition, the consultant received “war-
rants to purchase hundreds of thousand of shares” allegedly worth tens of 
millions of dollars.73 The court held that the waste claim fell “far short of 
meeting the stringent requirements of the waste test.”74 
Similarly, an increase in payments from $50,000 to $100,000 per 
month between the company and a consultant did not constitute waste 
even when coupled with allegations that the same parties controlled both 
entities.75 A “shared expenses fee,” the amount was paid as compensa-
tion for “overhead expenses,” including “rent, utilities, insurance, em-
ployee benefits, and the salaries of employees”.76 The court concluded 
that a reasonable person would find that the company received “adequate 
consideration” for the payments.”77  
The court also dismissed a claim for waste alleging overpayment to 
vendors for services in Zutrau v. Jansing.78 There, the plaintiff alleged 
that the CEO authorized transactions in which the company overpaid one 
vendor by $9,000 and another by $57,000.79 The court noted that, to sus-
tain a claim for waste, a plaintiff “must show that virtually no considera-
tion was received in the relevant exchange.”80 Moreover, the burden 
would not be met merely by “compar[ing] the amounts . . . charged dur-
ing [the plaintiff’s] tenure at [the company] with what [the company] 
charged in later years.” 81 With respect to one of the increases, the CEO 
offered “undisputed testimony that [the company] needed to increase the 
services . . . to meet competition” from another company.82 
Not all claims for waste involving vendors have, however, failed. In 
Quadrant Structured Products,
83
 the court allowed a claim to proceed 
that challenged fees paid under a services agreement and software li-
cense.84 Shareholders alleged that, after a change in control, the services 
  
 72. Id. at *2.  
 73. Id.  
 74. Id. at *7. (holding waste claim failed where “[t]he complaint merely alleges that the firms 
were overcompensated” and the complaint “does not alleged that [the financial advisory firms] were 
hired for other than a legitimate business purpose or that they failed to perform tasks for which they 
were retained.”)  
 75. Kates v. Beard Research, Inc., Civil Action No. 1480-VCP, 2010 WL 1644176, at *1 
(Del. Ch. Apr. 23, 2010). 
 76. Id. at *2.   
 77. Id. (holding waste claim not sufficiently alleged where increase in fee for overhead ex-
pense was associated with the business growing “from four to twelve” employees and then from 
twelve to sixteen employees during the relevant period).  
 78. Zutrau v. Jansing, C.A. No. 7457-VCP, 2014 WL 3772859 (Del. Ch. July 31, 2014). 
 79. Id. at *21.  
 80. Id.  
 81. Id. (noting plaintiff merely “compared the amounts that [the] company charged during her 
tenure ...with what it charged in later years” which was insufficient evidence of waste where defend-
ant “offered undisputed testimony that [the company] need to increase the services it obtained from 
vendors”.) 
 82. Id.  
 83. Quadrant Structured Prods. Co., Ltd. v. Vertin, 102 A.3d 155 (Del. Ch. 2014). 
 84. Id. at 193. 
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provided under the services agreement “substantially diminished” and, as 
a result, the “fees should have decreased.”85 Shareholders, however, as-
serted that instead the fees “climbed dramatically and far exceeded mar-
ket rates.”86 Recognizing that “excessive fees could fall so far beyond 
market standards as to amount to waste,” the court found that “while that 
seems improbable, it is reasonably conceivable.”87 
B. Compensation Payments 
Generous compensation packages will generally not constitute 
waste. As one court noted, “amount alone is not the most salient aspect” 
when determining waste.88 The courts have therefore upheld the grant of 
stock options worth tens of millions of dollars,89 a cash bonus of $1.8 
million,90 and a severance payment of $40 million.91 The court has 
acknowledged that waste will not occur even when the severance ap-
peared “extremely rich or altogether distasteful” so long as approved by 
“disinterested and independent” directors.92   
Nor will the court necessarily find waste even when the evidence 
suggests that the payments exceeded those of peer companies. In Cam-
bridge Retirement System v. Bosnjak,
 93
 plaintiffs alleged waste where the 
company paid compensation equivalent to 25% of the company’s yearly 
revenue.94 The complaint alleged that this compensation exceeded pay-
ments by eleven other companies in the same industry and with similar 
market capitalizations.95 The court did not, however, find the evidence 
compelling and dismissed the claim for waste.96  
The court did allow a case of waste involving benefits to the CEO to 
go forward in In re INFOUSA.97 There, shareholders challenged a variety 
of expenditures alleged to have benefited the CEO.98 These “included the 
  
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 169 (noting fees increased from $14 million in 2009 to $23.5 million in 2010). 
 87. Id. at 193.  
 88. Zucker v. Andreessen, C.A. No. 6014-VCP, 2012 WL 2366448, at *10 (Del. Ch. June 21, 
2012). 
 89. Zupnick v. Goizueta, 698 A.2d 384, 385 (Del. Ch.1997) (noting the Board awarded the 
Coca-Cola CEO options to purchase one million shares of the corporation’s stock exercisable ten 
years from the issuance date which was April 19th, 1995). 
 90. Seinfeld v. Slager, Civil Action No. 6462-VCG, 2012 WL 2501105, at *7 (Del. Ch. June 
29, 2012) 
 91. Zucker, 2012 WL 2366448, at *10. 
 92. Id.  
 93. Cambridge Ret. Sys. v. Bosnjak, C.A. No. 9178-CB, 2014 WL 2930869 (Del. Ch. June 
26, 2014). 
 94. Id. at *3. 
 95. Id. at *10.  
 96. Id. (noting that allegations the compensation was excessive relative to other similar 
healthcare companies “raise questions concerning the fairness of the outside directors’ compensa-
tion,” but do not “rise to the level necessary to establish a complete failure of consideration or that 
the director defendants authorized an exchange that was so one-sided that no reasonable business 
person could conclude” that adequate consideration was received.). 
 97. In re INFOUSA, Inc. S’holders Litig., 953 A.2d 963 (Del. Ch. 2007).  
 98. Id. at 971. 
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lease of aircraft and office space for personal use, the provision of a 
yacht, and a collection of luxury and collectible cares that would leave 
James Bond green with envy.”99 In allowing the case to go forward, the 
court relied on one instance where the shareholders alleged payments 
that appeared to provide little or no benefit to the corporation.100  
Substantial payments to a CEO can also meet the requirements of 
waste, at least where accompanied by allegations that the payments rep-
resented compensation for the CEO’s leadership of a “passive corpora-
tion.”101 In In re National Auto Credit, Inc. Shareholders Litigation, the 
plaintiffs alleged that the board committed waste when the board adopted 
an employment agreement for the CEO.102 The court refused to dismiss 
the waste claims.103 In analyzing the compensation, the court noted “[i]t 
is not the mere allegation that [the CEO] is being compensated some 
threshold amount that permits the Plaintiffs’ waste claim to proceed; 
instead, it is that [the CEO] is being paid a large sum of money to be the 
head of what essentially is a passive corporation.”104  
Courts will also provide careful scrutiny of compensation packages 
that have the potential to entrench management but otherwise provide the 
company with little benefit. In Sample v. Morgan,105 plaintiffs alleged 
that defendants received “nearly a third of the company’s voting power” 
and had “their taxes paid for them by the company, which had to go into 
debt in order to bestow that beneficence.”106 At the same time, the com-
pany apparently received little benefit as a result of the arrangement. As 
the court noted: “[T]he company got the three executives to stay without 
any indication that the three had offers to go elsewhere.” 107 In rejecting 
the motion to dismiss, the court stated “[i]f giving away nearly a third of 
the voting and cash flow rights of a public company for $200 in order to 
retain managers who ardently desired to become firmly entrenched just 
where they were does not raise a pleading stage inference of waste, it is 
difficult to imagine what would.”108 
  
 99. Id.  
 100. As one example, shareholders alleged that the company purchased a skybox at the Univer-
sity of Nebraska-Lincoln Football Stadium from the CEO, which failed to discount the asset to 
reflect “the value of tickets that mature at the same the same time that a baby born at the time of the 
transaction would be legally able to buy beer from a stadium vendor.” Id. at 1002. The court pro-
claimed, “[a] reasonable person might well consider this a sweetheart deal for [the CEO],” but that 
adequate consideration lacked. Id. 
 101. In re Nat’l Auto Credit, Inc. S’holders Litig., No. Civ.A. 19028, 2003 WL 139768, at *14 
(Del. Ch. Jan. 10, 2003). 
 102. Id. at *6.  
 103. Id. at *13–14.  
 104. Id. at *14,  
 105. Sample v. Morgan, 914 A.2d 647 (Del. Ch. 2007). 
 106. Id. at 670.  
 107. Id.  
 108. Id. at 652. 
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V.  EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
This section examines the reported cases addressing waste.109  The 
analysis shows that waste claims are infrequent. Since 2000, Delaware 
has decided 52 waste cases.110 Executive compensation and overpayment 
for services dominate these cases.  Most cases for waste (29) involve 
allegations of payment amount beyond acceptable market standards. Sig-
nificant payments alone will not be enough. Instead, they must be cou-
pled with other factors such as a decline in responsibilities associated 
with the payments.   
Only ten cases survived a motion to dismiss.111 Most involved alle-
gations of excessive compensation.  Courts may find waste where there 
is some evidence of a possible conflict of interest. For example, in Telx-
on v. Bogomolny and In re National Auto Credit, Inc., the plaintiffs al-
leged both waste and duty of loyalty violations, which the court did not 
dismiss.112 Further, In Seinfeld v. Coker, the board allegedly made pay-
ments of $300,000 to directors of an acquired company for no considera-
tion.113 It appears that waste is best brought when the conduct appears 
egregious enough to trigger a violation of fiduciary duty along with 
waste.  
An action of waste is difficult to sustain given the “no ordinary 
business person” standard. More recent cases, however, may suggest a 
shift in the approach.  The court in Quadrant Structured Products Co. 
Ltd v. Vertin allowed the case to go forward based upon a challenged to 
the structure of the transaction. 114  The court agreed that a claim for 
waste was made where  “the board could have charted a course” that 
would result in the company deferring certain interest payments.115 In 
addition, the court agreed that a claim for waste was stated as a result of 
allegations that certain fees exceeded market standards. In dealing with 
executive compensation, the court recently took a position that also indi-
cates liberalization in application. In the recent past, boards authorized 
substantial compensation based upon such benefits certain contractual 
releases from liability. In re Citigroup116, however, may signal a reduced 
patience with this approach.  Despite the broad language in Zucker v. 
  
 109. See infra Appendix B. 
 110. In determining the number of waste cases, I used a number of keyword searches in 
WestlawNext including such phrases as “corporate waste,” and “ATLEAST(4)(waste)” to generate 
an exhaustive list of waste cases. To verify the list of cases I ran additional searches that included 
“waste” and key terms often found such as “fiduciary duty.” 
 111. See infra Appendix A. 
 112. See Telxon Corp. v. Bogomolny, 792 A.2d 964, 974-76 (Del. Ch. 2001); In re Nat’l Auto 
Credit, Inc. S’holders Litig., No. Civ.A. 19028, 2003 WL 139768, at *1 (Del. Ch. Jan. 10, 2003). 
 113. See Seinfeld v. Coker, 847 A.2d 330, 331 (Del. Ch. 2000). 
 114. Quadrant Structured Prods. Co., LTD. v Vertin, 102 A.3d 193 (Del. Ch. 2014). 
 115. Id. 
 116. In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 138 (Del. Ch. 2009). 
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Andreessen
117
, the Citigroup court indicated that the same basic contrac-
tual terms in a severance agreement used in Zucker, which formed the 
basis of the court’s reasoning to dismiss the waste claim, did not auto-
matically justify the dismissal of a claim for waste in Citigroup.118  
  
 117. Zucker v. Andreessen, C.A. No. 6014-VCP, 2012 WL 2366448, at *1 (Del. Ch. June 21, 
2012). 
 118. Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 137. 
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